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Abstract
This paper argues against the assimilation of two models of causation and causal explanation within
the physicalist camp. One of them is Jaegwon Kim’s model of supervenient causation; the other is
Frank Jackson’s and Philip Pettit’s model of programme explanation. Assimilating moves have been
made on both sides. This paper aims to show that these moves are flawed because differences between
the models can easily be shown once the supervenience theses laying behind them are reconstructed.
This initial difference is shown to entail several further discrepancies. At the end of this paper, we
try to make sense of ‘causal relevance,’ on which the idea of a programme explanation rests, in order
to prevent further attempts to assimilate the two models.
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1. Introduction
An almost commonsensical and very much alive part of the legacy of the ‘unity
of science’ movement is a hierarchical view on the arrangements of scientific dis-
ciplines. On this traditional picture, physics is at the bottom of this stratification
starting from which other disciplines, through chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.,
build upon each other and culminate on the top in the sciences of society. This
picture has immense intuitive force. First of all, the picture proceeds from the sci-
ences of the simple to that of the complex. Thus it seemingly matches our initial
mereological intuition that the increasing complexity of phenomena is a result of the
combination of basic ingredients whatever they may be. Moreover, it also enables us
to explain fruitful theoretical interactions between neighbour disciplines. It makes
easy to explain why it is possible for psychology to be useful for sociology, and for
neurology to be useful for psychology, and so forth. Originally, this picture was
designed to serve certain reductionist intentions. As PUTNAM and OPPENHEIM
explicate this model,1 the sciences standing higher in this hierarchy are expected
∗I am indebted to Alexander Bird, Jessica Brown, Gábor Forrai, Peter Lipton, Hugh Mellor, Bence
Nánay for helpful comments and discussion. I also wish to thank Michael Bresalier for improving
my English. While writing this paper I was supported by an Eötvös Fellowship. An earlier version
of this paper was read to an audience at the University of Bristol.
1Cf. Putnam and Oppenheim, 1958.
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to reduce to lower level ones. The procedure of theory reduction for them can take
various routes. One may try to define and thereby reduce the terms of a science
in terms of a reducing science, thus providing a unified vocabulary; or the laws of
a science can reduce to the laws of some other discipline resulting in explanatory
unity. But one need not be committed to reduction in order to endorse a hierarchical
picture like this. One may refuse to accept the possibility of reduction for various
reasons, while maintaining that this stratification is still an apt characterisation of
the interdisciplinary relations. FODOR,2 for instance, argues for the ‘autonomy’ of
special sciences on the basis that there are law-like regularities in nature that are not
reducible to the laws of more basic sciences, because the concepts employed in the
formulation of these laws cannot be translated into one another and thus the causal
taxonomies of the special sciences do not map unequivocally onto that of the ‘more
basic’, physical sciences.
Along similar lines, physicalists are frequently divided into two camps, as
reductivists and non-reductivists. Both positions raise questions in connection with
the internal relations of this hierarchical structure, especially ones that concern
the status of the special sciences, namely those that cannot be labelled without
further ado as physical sciences. More specifically, the questions usually concern
a satisfactory account of the nature of special-science properties, their relations to
each other and to more fundamental properties, and of the explanatory role they can
play. At the present stage of the controversies, there is a proliferation of theories
that argue either for various versions of reductionist or anti-reductionist strategies
in approaching these problems.3 Due to the unsettled state of the art, unifying
tendencies are to be welcomed. In his recent book Jaegwon KIM takes a step towards
this direction, as he proposes to assimilate two models that explain the metaphysical
status of special sciences. He argues that his model of supervenient causation (SC) is
essentially identical to the model of programme explanation (PE) as it is put forward
by Frank JACKSON and Philip PETTIT.4 As KIM puts it: PE ‘does not substantially
differ from what I used to advocate as a way of handling mental causation – the model
of ‘supervenient causation’.’5 Essentially the same position appears in JACKSON,6
who agrees with KIM in approaching PE as a special version of SC. Later the paper
will focus on KIM’s argument for the identification mainly because JACKSON thinks
their identity self-evident and not in need for argument. KIM thinks that the models
share a commitment to epiphenomenalism at least as far as supervenient properties
that are invoked in special science explanations are concerned. Thus supervenient
causal relations are also epiphenomenal because real causal processes must be
located among the properties of the supervenience base. And epiphenomena can
have only informational relevance. They are causally impotent, though they can
provide information about the underlying processes. According to his argument,
2Cf. Fodor, 1974 and also 1997.
3Cf. e.g. Fodor, 1997; Woodward, 2000.
4Cf. Jackson and Pettit, 1988, 1990, 1992.
5Kim, 1998: 74.
6Jackson, 1998b: 102.
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there is nothing more to JACKSON and PETTIT’s proposal than this same perspective.
This paper will evaluate KIM’s judgement, and will show that KIM is mistaken
in various respects. First, I provide a short introduction to the models at issue.
Second, I try to reveal what could have led him and JACKSON astray in identifying
the models. Then I draw some conclusions. I compare the two models, arguing that
KIM is wrong to claim that the two models are identical because, despite superficial
and possibly deceptive similarities, SC and PE prescribe different constraints on the
domains they concern. To place my cards on the table, my argument should show
that
1. the metaphysical background implicit in PE differs in important respects from
KIM’s SC model of explanation; and that
2. SC is entailed by a specific view on explanation argued for by KIM himself,
which is incompatible with the core idea of PE.
Finally, I complete my argument by showing that PE may make sense as a
form of causal explanation, without being identical with SC. Let me add, however,
that in this paper I do not evaluate either SC or PE; I would only like to correct a
mistaken view, and through this correction to show how to interpret PE.
Although the direct aim is to show that the two models are not identical,
I note that this result also has positive relevance. The argument contributes to
the clarification of what the models imply. The proper understanding of their
implications has remarkable significance for the debates about the status of special
sciences. JACKSON and PETTIT7 formulated PE with the intention of solving some
puzzles about the causal character of psychological explanations appealing to broad
mental content. In their later work their proposal was extended so as to cover various
kinds of structural, functional, disjunctive, etc. properties, thus making it suitable
for accounting for the explanatory structure of the special sciences in general.8
KIM’s SC was designed to be a solution to similar problems in the same domains.
Thus, if my argument is correct, we will see that what we actually have here are
two rival theories, instead of having two, merely superficially different versions of
the same suggestion.
2. The Models in a Nutshell
2.1. SC
In order to understand the idea of SC, first we need to understand the world in
which such causal relations may obtain. This world is a microdeterministic world
where the characteristics of wholes strongly supervene on the characteristics of
their microconstituents. This means, in turn, that ‘a general claim of macro-micro
7Jackson and Pettit, 1988.
8Jackson and Pettit, 1990, 1992.
166 T. DEMETER
supervenience then becomes the Democritean atomistic doctrine that the world is
the way it is because the microworld is the way it is’.9 If strong supervenience
is combined with KIM’s Democritean commitment to microdeterminism, then we
arrive to the thesis of mereological supervenience.10 One possible formulation goes
as follows: For any macro property F of an individual, there is a set G of some
combinations of microphysical properties of the parts of the individual such that it
is nomologically necessary that any individual instantiating any member of set G
instantiates F .
If macro-properties must be understood on the mereological picture, then they
do not have independent causal powers. Causal potential is rooted at the macro levels
in a mereological way in the microcomponents of individuals. Therefore there are
no mysteriously emergent causal powers that could be irreducibly separated from
the properties and relations that belong to the individual. This gives rise to the
causal inheritance principle:11 If F is instantiated by being realised by G then
the causal powers associated with F must be identical with, or be a subset of G’s
causal powers. It follows that when F is realised on another occasion by another
set of properties, then the causal power of this instance of F will be identical with
that of its actual realiser. Therefore, as KIM himself also puts it,12 SC is a kind of
epiphenomenal causation. Thus the definition of SC is as follows (cf. KIM, 1984:
99; 1998: 74): x’s having F is a supervenient cause of y’s having F∗ if and only
if x has G and y has G∗ that subveniently fix F and F∗ respectively, and there
is an objective causal connection between G and G∗. This means that the causal
relation F → F∗ holds only in virtue of there being a subvenient causal connection
G → G∗.
2.2. PE
The primary question that JACKSON and PETTIT seek to answer concerns the prob-
lem of the role played by broad psychological properties, i.e. ones that are, at least
partly, rooted outside the mind. How is it possible for broad mental states to have a
causal role in bringing about behaviour, how can they figure legitimately in causal
explanations? As JACKSON and PETTIT argue in their 1988 paper, it is appropriate
to distinguish between two kinds of properties invoked in causal explanations, and
analogously, between two kinds of causal explanation that explain in virtue of these
properties. PEs refer to properties which are not causally efficacious with respect to
a given event, but causally relevant to it. This highlights that there are two distinct
ways in which causal explanations can be formulated. One is process explanation,
a traditional way that appeals to properties causally effective in a process. The
9Kim, 1998: 18.
10Cf. e.g. Kim, 1997: 192; and also Enç, 1995: 169.
11Cf. e.g. Kim, 1998: 54.
12Kim, 1984: 95ff; 1998: 74f.
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second kind of causal explanation is a PE, which does not cite a causal history con-
strued in terms of the causally efficacious process. Rather it appeals to functional,
disjunctive, or relational properties. PEs give modal information in the sense that
they cover a range of possible situations each of which could have produced the
actual result and one of them actually did. The realisation of a higher-level property
ensures that there is an efficacious property, which performs the causal work, while
the higher-level property itself does not figure in the efficacious process.
3. What the Two Models Share
Prima facie, it may not be surprising that KIM and JACKSON think the two models
identical. Both imply strong physicalist commitments, but – and this is what they
overlook – they do so in different ways. The proponents of the two models may
agree with the main points of PETTIT’s summary of the claims that must be endorsed
by those who identify themselves with the label ‘physicalist’.13 What PETTIT does
in this paper is to explain the content of the central physicalist claim, namely that the
empirical world, as CRANE and MELLOR put it, ‘contains just what a true complete
physics would say it contains’.14 PETTIT breaks up this claim into two pairs of theses
that must be accepted by those who endorse a physicalist metaphysics. The theses
are as follows:15
1.a There are microphysical entities; and
1.b they constitute everything.
2.a There are microphysical regularities; and
2.b they govern everything.
So far SC and PE need not differ, KIM and JACKSON are apparently right in
identifying the models. The agreement in the content of the two models’ physicalism
can easily suggest that what they think about causation and explanation can be
equated. One source of the mistake of identification may result from this agreement
as far as the background of the models is concerned. The real differences lie below
this superficial isomorphism. In the following I will identify two main differences.
The first is concerned with the commitment to the existence of a bottom physical
level. I argue that SC posits a bottom physical level, while PE is independent of any
commitment of this kind. Secondly, I argue that there is a substantial difference in
the specific forms of supervenience theses which SC and PE are built upon.
13Pettit, 1993.
14Crane and Mellor, 1990: 186.
15Pettit, 1993: 214ff.
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4. Metaphysical Differences
4.1. Levels: Bottom or Infinitely Descending
According to PE, the realisation of a higher-level, programming property ensures
that there is an efficacious property, which performs the causal work, while the
programming property does not figure in the efficacious process itself. If the pro-
gramming/efficacious distinction is taken in the absolute sense, then efficacious
properties – and, correspondingly, causal explanations in terms of efficacious prop-
erties – can be located presumably only on the fundamental physical level. However,
for pragmatic reasons, JACKSON and PETTIT allow for a relativistic interpretation
of the distinction.16 As we are rarely in the position to identify the causally effi-
cacious microphysical properties, ‘most of the explanations we are ever likely to
offer will be of the programme variety.’17 But PEs presuppose the presence of an
efficacious property, therefore we need to locate the efficacious properties relative
to the programming properties. In this sense mental properties can be taken to
be efficacious in relation to social properties; neurological properties in relation to
mental properties; bio-chemical properties in relation to neurological properties,
and so on. The distinction can always be drawn and re-drawn with an eye to the
explanation we want to give. And this picture is consistent with an infinitely de-
scending regress of levels: there is no need for a fundamental physical level in order
to make sense of causal explanation.
KIM is not clear about the relation of his model to a bottom level. Sometimes,
he is ready to acknowledge that ‘there is a bottom level, one consisting of whatever
microphysics is going to tell us are the most basic physical particles out of which
all matter is composed,’ and also admits that the multitiered picture ‘carries the
assumption that there is a bottom tier, a layer of entities that have no physically
significant parts’.18 Elsewhere he says that ‘the layered model as such does of course
not need to posit a bottom level; it is consistent with an indefinitely descending series
of levels’.19 Still, it does not take too much effort to reveal that his model entails a
commitment to a bottom level.
Supervenience relations create a layered world where lower levels include the
entities whose properties are thought to determine higher ones, and the causal rela-
tions on the subvenient levels also determine supervenient causal relations. Given
that higher levels are completely determined by the micro levels, two individuals are
indiscernible in relation to level L if and only if they are micro-indiscernible. KIM’s
definition is as follows: For the properties of any two individuals belonging to L ,
if they are indiscernible in relation to properties of their constituents at all levels
lower than L , then they are indiscernible with respect to all properties at L .20 Thus
16Jackson and Pettit, 1990: 116.
17Jackson and Pettit, 1988, 1990, 1992 provide a variety of examples.
18Kim, 1993a: 337; cf. also 1998: 15.
19Kim, 1998: 123n23.
20Cf. Kim, 1998: 17.
CAUSAL EXPLANATION 169
by definition, indiscernibility obtains only if there is a complete decomposition of
the individuals into non-overlapping proper parts, and complete decomposition is
possible just in case there is a bottom level on which decomposition can taken to
be finished. This ensures that there is a level of causation where genuine causal
relations obtain, and which supervenient causal relations are built upon. The ques-
tion is then whether KIM needs this strong concept of indiscernibility, or a weaker
one would do as well. Perhaps it would be enough to say that two individuals
are indiscernible at L if there obtains indiscernibility at any level lower than L .21
This may seem sufficient for indiscernibility at L , and also at levels higher than L ,
because if we take the indiscernible level as the supervenience base for L then the
indiscernibility of the supervenience bases imply indiscernibility at every superve-
nient level. This seems to allow for getting along without the identification of the
bottom level.
But this route is not open for KIM for he proposes the following argument else-
where.22 Higher-level properties are typically multiply realisable, i.e. higher-level
properties may be realised by infinitely many different subvenient structures. As
the causal power of these properties is dependent on their realisers, the causal power
of two properties will be identical only if their realisers are identical as well. Differ-
ences in realisers may result in causal differences; therefore higher-level properties
belong to causally heterogeneous kinds consisting of infinitely long disjunctions of
realiser properties. This means that if the decomposition of two individuals stops on
a level higher than the bottom one, the indiscernible common properties found may
belong to a causally heterogeneous kind. They cannot guarantee the indiscernibility
of properties supervenient on them because their causal power is entirely inherited
from their actual realisers. If the realiser is different in the two individuals, then
the outcome may turn out to be different at higher supervenient levels. Only full
decomposition to the bottom level can ensure indiscernibility at all levels. Further-
more, if there were no bottom level then there would be no genuine causal relations
in KIM’s world: if every level is supervenient on another then causal relations are
always supervenient causal relations. Consequently, while PE is neutral concerning
the bottom level as the model is consistent both with and without it, SC is committed
to the existence of a bottom level and does not make sense without it.
4.2. Supervenience: Global vs. Mereological
There is a more important point at which SC and PE are different. JACKSON and
PETTIT created their model in order to solve the problem of broad psychological
explanations. Psychological explanations refer to mental states; they explain be-
haviour, as it is commonly put, in virtue of beliefs and desires. Mental states are
frequently defined functionally, in terms of the causal role they occupy. In this
sense, being in a mental state means being in a certain neurological (realiser) state
21I owe this point to Peter Lipton.
22Kim, 1992.
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under relational characterisation. However, since PUTNAM’s famous argument,23
it became common wisdom in philosophy that some mental states have broad con-
tent, since they are related to the state of affairs in the world in a way that has a
significant role to play in determining their content. This entails that mental states
cannot be internal neurological states under some specific relational characterisa-
tions, as functionalists argue. They must be more than that, since they are not
exclusively in the head. Mental states do not supervene exclusively on the internal
neurological structure, but on this internal physical structure plus some physical
facts about the environment. Even if two persons are in the same physical state, the
content of their thoughts, as one can conclude from PUTNAM’s well-known Twin
Earth example, may nevertheless be different, provided that there are differences
in their environments. Now, the original challenge for JACKSON and PETTIT was
to solve the puzzle arising from the tension of the functionalist view and the reality
of broad content appealed to in psychological explanations. They did this by mak-
ing a distinction between causal relevance and efficacy, claiming that mental states
have the former but not the latter. The presence of a causally relevant mental state
ensures, or programmes for, the presence of a causally efficacious property, which
is in charge of the causal work.
For KIM the case to be solved is quite different. As is obvious, mereologi-
cal supervenience does not allow for the existence of broad mental content in any
philosophically interesting sense. On the mereological picture it is not possible
for mental states, or special-science properties in general, to include properties of
the external world, or even relational properties of individuals and their environ-
ment. For KIM,24 the psychological one is supervenient exclusively on internal
constitution, therefore what we need in, for example, psychological explanations
can be given in terms of neurologically reducible narrow content properties that
lack reference to any facts of the environment. Two persons being identical in
all mereological levels lower than the mental one are identical psychologically –
without respect to the differences in their surroundings. The proper causes of their
behaviour can be fully located within their internal physical structure: if they are in
the same physical state, their behaviour will be the same as well – given, of course,
that they receive the same stimulus.
Therefore, on a closer scrutiny, PE and SC are found to be different against the
background of the type of their authors’ physicalist commitments. PE is designed
to solve a problem that simply does not exist within KIM’s physicalist framework.
And as they are searching for solutions for only partially overlapping problems,
they cannot provide substantially similar answers. Furthermore, there is a deeper
issue here. Both being physicalist, the two models are committed to the super-
venience of the mental on the physical. But the specific form and content of the
supervenience theses on which they rely are quite different. Given the intention of
accommodating broad content in a functionalist picture of the mind, PE is inconsis-
tent with the mental being mereologically supervenient on the physical. The kind
23Putnam, 1975.
24Cf. also Kim, 1982
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of supervenience that can properly be associated with PE can only take the form of
a global supervenience thesis.25 From this perspective, mental properties are super-
venient on a relation between internal physical structure and certain facts about the
environment. This means that mental properties are eventually supervenient both
on extrinsic, relational properties and intrinsic ones, instead of being supervenient
exclusively on intrinsic ones.
The roots of this difference can be understood in terms of the difference
between the posits on which the two models are built. As we have seen above, the
two models agree in the crucial physicalist theses on PETTIT’s list, but they perhaps
would not agree with the elaboration that PETTIT attaches to some of the theses.
One of these is certainly the fourth remark added to (1.a),26 which goes as follows:
the physicalist ‘may think of the microphysical realm in a non-atomist way; he may
believe that certain relational, microphysical properties – apart from spatio-temporal
properties – are in some way fundamental’. This is consistent with the global
supervenience thesis that PE is built upon, but inconsistent with the Democritean
atomism that KIM endorses and formulates in his mereological supervenience thesis.
The case is quite straightforward: although mereological composition can allow,
in the supervenience base, for relations between the properties of the individual
and remain consistent with the local character of mereological supervenience, it is
not open to include relational properties of the individual and its environment, only
intrinsic ones. Otherwise the mereological thesis would cease to be local (and would
not count as mereological either), and would turn into a global supervenience claim.
This brings out the difference behind PE and SC: both are physicalist models but
they envisage physicalism in different ways. PE entails a holistic, or non-atomistic,
view of the world, while SC insists on a Democritean atomistic picture. Far from
being identical, PE and SC are incompatible.
5. Constraints on Explanation
What do these differences amount to in relation to causal explanation? The SC
model implies the principles of explanatory realism and explanatory exclusion,
commitments not shared by PE. Behind this difference it is easy to recognise the
initial divergence portrayed above concerning the supervenience theses on which
the models are built. These are clearly consistent and follow inevitably providing
that one accepts mereological supervenience as the basis of physicalism, but they
are inconsistent with a physicalism based on global supervenience. I will introduce
these two principles that KIM happily associates to SC, and I hope to show here that
JACKSON and PETTIT cannot do the same with PE.
25Elsewhere Jackson (1998: 12) explicitly accepts a global supervenience thesis, which supports
indirectly my present argument.
26Pettit, 1993: 215.
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5.1. Explanatory Realism
KIM frequently tends to assimilate explanation and causation.27 In his view they are
two sides of the same coin: explanation is the subjective, causation is the objective
side. This amounts to a difference in the way of thinking about them: explanation
is the business of epistemology, while causation pertains to metaphysics. This
difference, however, is not especially significant, because in order for an explanation
to be true it must correspond to something objective in the world. As nothing can
count as knowledge if not true, our knowledge essentially implies reference to
objective reality, the knowledge that results from an explanation must conform to
the relation of events. This attitude results in insisting on the following judgement
on PE: if it intends to be a kind of causal explanation then it must necessarily
be in accordance with explanatory realism: Proposition C can be an explanans of
proposition E only in virtue of the fact that there is an appropriate (objective) causal
relation between the events referred to in C and E .28
For KIM no explanation can claim to be causal if this condition does not apply.
His reason is obvious: if an explanation is not adequate extensionally, if there is no
appropriate causal connection between the events referred to in the explanans and
the explanandum, then the explanation lacks the crucial causal component. And
as KIM puts it, ‘any weaker conception would merely cheapen the idea of causal
explanation’.29 If this is translated into JACKSON and PETTIT’s idiom, KIM’s
‘appropriate causal connection’ means a causally efficacious connection. Pretend-
ing that explanations that do not correspond with real causal connections between
events are nevertheless causal explanations results in inevitably false explanations:
explanatory realism can be properly read as a necessary condition for an explanation
to be causal.
The very idea of PE is inconsistent with explanatory realism, provided that
the distinction between causal efficacy and causal relevance is meaningful.30 JACK-
SON and PETTIT clearly claim that, as they understand it, PE is a kind of causal
explanation.31 Causal, in spite of its reference to events which themselves are not
causally efficacious. For them the causal character of PEs is retained by the fact
that they appeal to connections that are causally relevant. What kind of causal role
is causal relevance? Given the kind of supervenience thesis associated with PE it
is clear that the events invoked in process explanations and in PEs, although en-
tirely independent, are nevertheless different. This arises from the nature of global
supervenience thesis. As we have seen above, psychological properties, as well as
other special-science properties, are supervenient on internal physical constitution
and some facts about the environment. This means that, according to PE, there is
no property identity, or reducibility between physical and psychological properties.
27E.g. in Kim, 1987.
28Kim, 1987: 229f.
29Kim, 1998: 75.
30Child (1994: ch.6.) provides various reasons for the acceptance of this distinction.
31Both in Jackson and Pettit, 1988, 1990.
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In virtue of global supervenience, properties referred to in PEs can be causally
relevant, and thus causally explanatorily informative, without being causally effica-
cious. Programming properties ensure that there is a causally efficacious property
at work because their supervenience base incorporates causally efficacious prop-
erties. Therefore, the acceptance of the programme model must entail the denial
of explanatory realism. Thus the only question that arises concerns the concrete
content of ‘causal relevance’. We will try to clarify it under Section 6.
5.2. Explanatory Exclusion
Explanatory realism does not deny that explanations referring to causally inactive
properties can have some sort of explanatory force. They can be usefully invoked
in explanations, and their relevance is properly called ‘informational relevance’,32
but they cannot be causally explanatory. Explanations appealing to causally in-
ert, epiphenomenal properties can provide some information about the underlying
causal processes, but they can be explanations only in a derivative sense. This is
the role KIM thinks to be properly associated with PE. KIM’s explanatory realism,
due to the strong requirement to invoke causally efficacious properties in causal
explanations, entails the principle of explanatory exclusion.33 On this principle,
there can be two (or even more) correct causal explanations of an event E only
if either one of the two is incomplete, or one is dependent on the other. Suppose
therefore that
(1) Explanation X explains event E by citing C as a cause, and also that
(2) Explanation X∗ explains event E by citing C∗ as a cause.
On the principle of explanatory exclusion the following must be true of the
relation of these two explanations:
(a) C = C∗, i.e. they are nomic equivalents;
(b) C∗ is reducible to C;
(c) C and C∗ are co-ordinate causal factors, or
(c’) C is a proper part of C∗;
(d) C and C∗ are sequential causal factors;
(e) C and C∗ are sufficient causes of E on their own right (a case of causal
over-determination).
It follows, in each case, that E has only one complete and independent expla-
nation, which is a proper causal explanation containing all the factors relevant in
bringing about E . Other explanations of the same event have merely derivative sig-
nificance, and against the background of the complete explanation do not improve
the epistemic situation. As a corollary, the special sciences are not autonomous in
32Kim, 1998: 75.
33Kim, 1989: 257.
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any relevant sense, because the explanations they give are wanting and reducible to
some more fundamental level. Explanatory exclusion thus denies the possibility of
there being any epistemic gain in special-science explanations over and above the
complete explanation, which is provided by the basic sciences.
As PE provides an account of how the special sciences could promise more
than a redundant and wanting story of what can be told completely on a lower level,
PE is inconsistent with this principle as well. On PE it is possible to have two
explanations of the same event, not excluding each other, without over-determining
the event. JACKSON and PETTIT refer to PUTNAM’s example to illuminate the
case.34 Imagine we have a one inch rigid cubical peg, a rigid surface and two holes
on it, one of which is a circle one inch in diameter, the other is a one inch high square.
It is now open to explain the failure of the peg to fit into the round hole in two ways.
X) It is possible to cite microphysical laws and particles to explain, or to deduce from
them, that the given microphysical structures allow only one trajectory by which it
is possible for the peg to pass through the surface. X∗) It is also possible to refer to
elementary geometrical facts, to the rigidity of the components, i.e. to higher-order
properties, and thereby explaining the fact that the peg can only pass through the
square hole. What is the relation between the two explanations? Explanation X
involves the full story, and gives a description of the situation in terms of causally
efficacious properties. Explanation X∗, however, cannot be reduced to it because
X∗, and by appealing to geometry, provides information not involved in X ; although
the properties X∗ refers to supervene on the properties X refers to: the presence of
the structural features appealed to in X∗ ensures, or programs for, the presence of a
microphysical structure which is in fact causally efficacious in, and thus responsible
for, producing the result.
6. Making Sense of Causal Relevance: Outlines of a Proposal
Given that PE is inconsistent with the principle of explanatory realism is it still worth
calling it causal explanation? There are two ways of answering yes to this question,
but only one of them seems promising. The easy and unsatisfactory answer is to
argue that explanatory realism is a too strong requirement and should be replaced by
a more liberal constraint on causal explanation. One can cite, for example, David
LEWIS who claims that to explain causally means to provide causal information
about how an event occurs.35 As KIM himself is ready to acknowledge, reference to
epiphenomena can provide information about the underlying causal processes, and
thus PE would classify as a causal explanation. However, this answer falls short
of our needs. On this account SC would be a causal explanation as good as PE is,
and this would make the models isomorphic instead of showing their difference.
Besides, KIM would not admit SC as a proper causal explanation, while JACKSON
and PETTIT would insist that PE is in fact a proper one. Furthermore, this answer
34Jackson and Pettit, 1988: 394f.
35Lewis, 1986.
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may seem to be ad hoc, as it doesn’t make use of the idea of causal relevance that
should ensure the causal character of the explanations given in virtue of PE. In order
to retain this causal character we need to see what causal relevance consists in.
A property can be causally relevant if it affects the causal powers of its bearer,
that is, if it makes a real causal difference. Otherwise it would be hard to imagine
how a property could have any causal role to play. Now, how can we judge the causal
power of a property? If a property is causally efficacious it means that it in fact
brings about the effect. The problem is to distinguish a programming property from
an efficacious one without losing causal powers in the former. Some may object that
currently there is no account of causation that could catch the differences between
causal explanations put in terms of relevant as opposed to efficacious properties.36
Here I try to show how it is still possible to explain the kind of causation underlying
PE. I propose an approach to causation in terms of raising the chances of effects.
On this account it is not necessary for a cause to bring about an event in order for
it to count as a cause, it is enough if it raises the chances of the effect. This simply
means that the chance (ch) of an effect (E) is greater with a cause (C) than without
it. To put it formally: chC(E) > ch∼C(E).37 Now, consider the PE model from this
angle. We can be confident that programming and causally efficacious causes do
not bring about their effects with the same chances. chC(prog)(E) = ch∼C(effic)(E),
for a given neurological state can cause behaviour with some chance, while the
corresponding mental state can be cited as a cause with some different chance.
This is because the supervenience base of the mental state incorporates, beside the
neurological state, some other factors that effect its causal potentials. This entitles
us to say that here we have two different causes and neither loses causal power to
the other.
The core of this response is that the presence of programming properties makes
real causal difference because they represent different causal potentials. This does
not hold for mereologically supervenient properties, due to the causal inheritance
principle (cf. Section 2.1). Still an objection may arise. One might point out
that the approach I propose to distinguish between the two causal relations shows
only a quantitative difference instead of a qualitative: chC(prog)(E) is different from
chC(effic)(E) merely in degree and not in kind. On this reading the proposal is not
sufficient to establish the difference between two kinds of causal explanation. The
response to this criticism is as follows: the difference in degree is only the first
step towards understanding their character. This difference merely reflects a deeper
metaphysical gap between the nature of programming and efficacious properties.
This gap, as we argued in Section 4.2, is due to the fact that the supervenience base
properties of programming properties may include relational properties. Thus we
arrived again to the initial difference of the supervenience theses underlying PE and
SC. This ensures that programming and efficacious properties may be different, and
that the causal potentials they have are also different in kind.
36Cf. Thalos, 1998.
37Mellor, 1995: 67ff.
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